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OCCURRENCE HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS MODEL (OHFAM)
1. Luo Min

2. Rong Mei

3.Li Jing

China Academy of Civil Aviation Science and Technology
Beijing 100028，China
In order to enhance the classification, analysis and utilization of safety information, China civil
aviation develops a more suitable model named “Occurrence Human Factors Analysis
Model(OHFAM)” ,which based on the “Human Factors Analysis and Classification System”
(HFACS) and the actual operation conditions and characteristics of China civil aviation. This model
consists of five layers and especially adds the layer of “Government Supervision” which reflects the
deficiency of regulatory authorities in Safety Supervision. On the basis of safety information analysis
and extensive research, OHFAM considers safety culture and operational characteristics of China
civil aviation, and offers five layers in details from flight, maintenance and air traffic control.
In this paper, the basic elements and functions of OHFAM are introduced. And then we use this
model to analyze the incidents of the last five years (2006-2010) of China, and sum up the main
contributing factors.
OHFAM’s Origin and Characteristics
Since 1940, International Aviation indicated 75% of the accidents were due to one or more "human error", and
then we got the point gradually that “to error is human”, it means that we should not only concern about human error,
but more in-depth study on the organization and management factors behind the human error.
The most well-known human factors analysis model proposed by James Reason in 1990 is “Swiss cheese model”.
According to this model, the failures of all levels interact and lead to disastrous consequences; the failures are the
"holes” of system at different levels 1)[1]. Based on Swiss cheese model, Wiegmann and Shappell1)[2]1)[3] developed the
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
（HFACS）
，this model helps to define the “holes of cheese model” to
promote the availability in accident investigation and information analysis.

However, the existing human factors analysis model cannot fully meet China's actual needs. On one hand, the
classification of factors and items in China is slight different, on the other hand, the existing model does not involve the
top management of civil aviation authorities - the government factors. Therefore, after the combination of HFACS and
human factors of previous research results 1)[4] , we develop a more suitable model named “Occurrence Human Factors
Analysis Model (OHFAM)” for China civil aviation human factors analysis. It has five layers including “Unsafe
Behavior”, “Preconditions for Unsafe Behavior”, “Department Management”, “Organizational Influence” and
“Government Supervision”. The model clarifies its sub-categories of factors (as shown in Figure 1) and gives various
items as the expression of each factor. The OHFAM’s checklist gives targeted items to differ from flight, maintenance
and ATC in “Unsafe Behavior” and “Preconditions for Unsafe Behavior”, expanding the model’s availability.
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Figure 1 OHFAM Framework
Unsafe Behavior
“Unsafe behavior” refers to the frontline operator’ behavior that violates the objective laws of safe operation
during the work process, and lead to occurrence directly. In OHFAM, “unsafe behavior” can be classified into two
categories: violations and errors. Violations represent the willful disregard for the rules and regulations that ensure the
safety of flight. Errors represent the mental or physical activities of individuals that fail to achieve their intended
outcome. It can be classified into three categories: skill-based error, decision-making error and cognitive error.

Preconditions for Unsafe Behavior
“Precondition for unsafe behavior” is the adverse objective and subjective conditions which cause the unsafe
behavior. In OHFAM, it can be classified into three categories: “environmental factors”, “operator status” and “group
resource management”. “Environmental factors” refers to the physical and technological environment which reduces
the operator’s performance or lead to unsafe behavior. “Operator status” is the personal condition which may reduce the
operator’s performance, including “mental status”, “physiological status”, “physical/mental limitations”, and
“individual readiness”. Besides, “Group resource management” refers to the poor communication or collaboration
among the operator and their group which may lead to the occurrence.
Department Management
“Department Management” refers to the supervisor at the middle management does not effectively control or
monitor the status of front-line operators and their operating environment, In OHFAM, it can be classified into four
categories: “inadequate supervision”, “planned inappropriate operations”, “failed to correct problem” and “supervisory
violation”.“Inadequate supervision” refers to the middle managers failed to fully perform its regulatory functions.
“Planned inappropriate operations” refer to the department managers do not consider completely when they make the
operational plans or the plans are unreasonable. “Failed to correct problem” refers to those instances when the
deficiencies of individuals, equipments ,trainings or other related safety areas are “known” to the middle manager, yet
are allowed to continue unabated.“Supervisory violation” refers to those instances when existing rules and regulations
are willfully disregarded by middle manager.
Organizational Influence
“Organization influence” refers to the top management’s inappropriate decision. In OHFAM, it can be classified
into three categories: “resource management”, “operational process” and “organizational climate”. “Resource
Management” encompasses the decision of corporate-level regarding the allocation and maintenance of organizational
assets such as human resources, monetary assets, and equipment and information. “Operational process” refers to the
processes that govern the daily activities, establish and maintain of standardized operation procedures, and keep
balances between the workforce and management. It can be reflected from the operation management, procedures, and
oversight. “Organizational climate” refers to a broad class of organizational variables that influence worker
performance. It can be reflected from the organization’s structure, policy guidance and organizational culture.
Government Supervision
“Government Supervision” reflects the deficiency of regulatory authorities in safety supervision. In OHFAM, it
can be classified into four categories: “supervision and monitoring”, “macro regulatory control”, “regulation and

standards” and “safety culture”. “Supervision and monitoring” refers to civil aviation regulatory authorities supervise
and evaluate their enterprises, and expose the related illegal and violation activities. “Macro regulatory control” refers
to civil aviation regulatory authorities’ plan of infrastructure development and the pace or the direction of industry to
achieve a goal of a safe, stable and sustainable development. “Regulation and standards” is the rational induction and
systematic summary of the safety law, working experience and practice of aviation operation. “Safety culture”
encompasses scientific safety management concept, the right values and the strict criterion.
The Analysis of Crew Caused Incidents Based On OHFAM
We use the OHFAM to analyze the 76 crew caused incidents1 of the last five years from 2006 to 2010 in China,
and determine what kind of the factors and items happened frequent (as shown in Table 1).
Table1
Analysis of the Last 5 Years Crew Caused Incidents Based on OHFAM
Layer( Factors)

fn
Violation

42

Skill-based error

124

Unsafe Behavior
Error

Decision-making error

36

Cognitive error

37

Environmental factors
Precondition

99

for

Unsafe Behavior
Operator status

1

122

a)

Items

fn

Violate flight operation procedure

22

b) Violate ATC instruction

7

a)

Delayed manipulation

13

b) Poor attention distribution

13

c)

Delayed deviation amendment

12

a)

Wrong decision of go around

21

b)

Improper takeoff\ landing decision

9

a)

Misjudge distance/altitude/airspeed

12

b) Loss of location consciousness

5

a)

Wind

19

b)

Rain\Snow

17

c)

Poor visibility

15

a)

Unfamiliar with airport

21

b)

Poor practical experience

18

c)

Poor theoretical knowledge

16

d)

Fluke mind

10

Data from the China Civil Aviation Safety Information Reporting Database.

Group resource management

Department

117

e)

Fatigue

3

a)

Lack of explicit distribution

18

b)

Insufficient cross-check

13

c)

Fail to conduct adequate brief

12

d)

Lack of proper authority gradient

9

Inadequate supervision

4

Fail to implement supervision

3

Planned inappropriate operations

20

Crewmember mismatch

12

Failed to correct problem

1

Fail to report unsafe information

1

a)

Insufficient CRM training

34

b)

Lack of theoretical training

17

c)

Lack of manipulation training

17

a)

Lack of risk management

4

b)

Lack of supervision

4

a)

Poor safety culture

10

b)

Insufficient group consciousness

3

Management

Resource management

112

Organization
Operational process

14

Organizational climate

17

Government

Regulation and standards

3

Incomplete regulation

3

Supervision

Supervision and monitoring

4

Absent supervision

3

Influence

Note： fn is an frequency which is the numbers of this factor or item per 100 crew caused incidents.
According to the frequency of the factors and items described above, it can be summarized in the following
significant issues.
1) Poor flight techniques. Analysis results show that the most common unsafe behavior is skill-based error, which
mainly reflects on “Delayed manipulation”, “Poor attention distribution” and “Delayed deviation amendment”. These
errors indicate the pilot’s flight techniques are not proficient.
2) Lack of teamwork. Analysis results show that the “Group resource management” of “precondition for unsafe
behavior” is the most important factors contributed to the incidents. It mainly reflects on “Lack of explicit distribution”,
“Insufficient cross-check” and “Fail to conduct adequate brief”. These errors indicate there are not effective

communications between crew members.
3) Crewmembers mismatch. Result about the group resource management also reflects the crew manning or
scheduling is inappropriate, especially on the authority gradient. Because most companies have adopted the automatic
scheduling to arrange the qualified pilots in a short time, but it cannot take into account the pilots’ technical
characteristics, operating custom, personality characteristics and other factors. The mismatch is always an issue.
4) Crew fatigue needs more attention. Crew fatigue is one of the significant problems of the past five years.
Airlines in China faced larger transportation pressure year by year, but were forced to operate at full capacity. In this
situation, the serious phenomenon is the shortfall of pilots especially the qualified caption, finally resulted in a heavy
workload and the reduced rest time, and then induced fatigue.
Conclusion
Based on the HFACS, this paper establishes the OHFAM considering features of China civil aviation. In summary,
the model can provide a systematic approach for accident investigation, which is conducive to guide the information
gathering and information analysis; The model considers the deep factors on the government layer, which is conducive
to find that the government regulatory problems; The model verify the theory that the accident was caused by the
interactive multi-level factors, which is conducive to provide the safety recommendations and measures.
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